LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are recurring questions that are policybased and those that are legally-based. Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and cannot be considered in isolation. However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the distinction between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or prohibition.
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of health reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for poverty level subsidies and cost-sharing for preventive services. In contrast, legal issues are those involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution allows a certain congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict.
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as those beginning with, "Should we…?", and legal questions can be framed as those beginning with, "Can we…?" The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular categories: 1) "Under the Constitution, can we ever…?"; 2) "Under current statutes and regulations, can we now…?"; 3) " Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?" This final set of questions tends to be mixed questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting. This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate. This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems addressed are either soluble or avoidable. Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a constructive activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation. Consequently, it does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is it an attempt to provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America. Furthermore, this project does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or make recommendations among them. Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide policy makers, attorneys, and other key stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health reform and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available for resolving those questions.
PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT
O
LEGAL ISSUES
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press, and current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal health reform. After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of over 50 legal issues was narrowed to ten. An initial framing paper was drafted which identified these ten legal issues and briefly outlined the main components of each. In May of 2008, a bipartisan consultation session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and framing of the legal issues. The attendees of the consultation session included congressional staff, executive branch officials, advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide range of interests affected by health reform. Feedback and analysis from this session further narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current law.
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant reform proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made. There are multiple other legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is adopted, the system changes. In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for an immediate discussion of federal health reform. Professor Jacobson's current research interests focus on the relationship between law and health care delivery, law and public health systems, public health ethics, and health care safety net services. Currently, he is the Principal Investigator (PI) on studies examining how public health practitioners define and resolve day-to-day ethical challenges, the impact of state and federal law on public health preparedness, and enhancing organizational and operational efficiencies in Michigan's health care safety net providers. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Prepared by the O'Neill Institute

INTRODUCTION:
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is a federal law regulating the administration of private employer-sponsored benefits including health benefits (i.e., health insurance offered by an employer). In general, since the federal government has exercised its authority to preempt state regulation of the administration of private employer-sponsored health plans, states are blocked from enforcing laws interfering with ERISA.
As many states pursue health care reform experiments, ERISA preemption becomes relevant as a potential limit on the scope and type of reforms states are able to enact. The dominant trend in ERISA litigation has been to preempt state legislation and litigation interfering with the administration of private employer sponsored health plans, making large-scale state health care reform initiatives difficult. The purpose of this paper is to examine the trajectory of judicial interpretation of ERISA and to discuss what opportunities exist to facilitate health care initiatives given the constraints of ERISA preemption.
RELEVANT LAW -ERISA PRIMER:
ERISA's Preemption Provisions  ERISA's preemption clause preempts all state laws that relate to an employee benefit plan.  ERISA contains an exception to this preemption rule, referred to as the "savings clause," that allows state laws to regulate the business of insurance.  Finally, ERISA (through the "deemer clause") prevents states from characterizing a selfinsured plan as the business of insurance.
ERISA's Remedial Scheme  Plan participants may bring a civil action under ERISA against a plan administrator who fails to comply with a request for information about the plan, to recover claimed benefits, to enforce rights under terms of the plan, or to clarify rights for future benefits.  A plan participant can only recover the amount of the benefits denied.  ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on those who make discretionary decisions on behalf of the employee benefit plan. However, courts tend to be very deferential to fiduciaries.
LITIGATION TRENDS:
ERISA litigation takes two general forms: the first involves challenges to state regulation of health plans and insurers, and the second involves challenges to state tort lawsuits for delay or denial of health care. Though the former is more directly relevant to health care reform initiatives, courts have used the same analyses in both litigation areas. While smaller-scale state reforms may survive ERISA preemption, it is an open question as to how the Supreme Court might rule on whether ERISA preempts state "pay-or-play" laws. between an insurer and insured are saved, thus not preempted. Such laws include "any willing provider" laws that prevent a health plan from excluding any health care provider who is willing and able to meet the terms and conditions of plan participation.
Challenges to State Regulation of Health Plans and Insurers
Challenges to State Tort Lawsuits
 State laws that offer a remedy that supplants ERISA's exclusive remedial structure, such as a breach of contract action against a managed care organization for denial of coverage or a law imposing a duty on a managed care organization to exercise ordinary care in handling coverage decisions, have generally been found to be preempted.
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that if ERISA preemption is to change, it is Congress' responsibility, not the Court's, to do so. There are several ways that the federal government can act:
Congressional Action  Enact ERISA waivers to permit state health reform experiments.  Amend ERISA to explicitly allow state-based tort litigation against managed care organizations.
Regulatory Action through Executive Authority  The Department of Labor (DOL) could define "plan" and "benefit" in ways that expand the relief available under ERISA's remedial scheme in regulations.  DOL could publish guidance on valid state options under ERISA.  DOL could amend regulations on the fiduciary duty obligations to require plan administrators to justify a benefit denial decision with evidence-based medicine.
CONCLUSION:
ERISA opinions are largely impenetrable, often leading to convoluted legal doctrine. Nobody can easily predict what will be preempted. Yet, there is a certain consistency that emerges over time-the return to preemption as the default option. Given this trend, states must tread carefully in crafting health care reform initiatives that address the crisis of the uninsured without impermissibly burdening private employers' provision of employee benefit plans. At this point, it would be premature to speculate on the actual contours of legislation that might be enacted. But initiatives under serious consideration include "pay-or-play" measures (where employers must either provide health insurance or pay the government a defined amount per employee), and mandating that individuals purchase health insurance (similar to mandatory automobile insurance). Since similar initiatives have already been enacted at the state level, one possible scenario is that Congress may coalesce around legislation that involves some type of state-federal cooperation.
Any comprehensive state-level health reform legislation or federal legislation that relies on state activity must take into account the states' vulnerability to ERISA preemption. An important aspect of the balance between federal and state authority is the concept of preemption, which means that the federal government can preclude states from regulating a particular area. 2 The rationale is to provide national uniformity in certain areas. When Congress legislates in an area and reserves power to the federal government, states may not regulate. For example, the federal government has exclusive authority for regulating nuclear power. That precludes, or preempts, any state or local attempts to regulate this field. Because ERISA preemption potentially limits the scope and type of reforms that the states might pursue, federal health reform proposals that rely on state experiments without amending ERISA could be undermined. Even if no federal legislation is enacted, ERISA preemption will remain central to the policy debate as to how far states can proceed on their own to enact comprehensive health reform laws. This is an ironic result in two respects. For one thing, at a time when federal policymakers are encouraging state health reform initiatives, a complex federal law may imperil aggressive state health coverage experiments. In the absence of federal action, ERISA preemption may block legitimate reforms that the political system desires. For another, if state efforts are indeed blocked, pressure is likely to mount on Congress either to amend ERISA or resolve the current political deadlock. The unintended consequence of ERISA preemption, therefore, is that a statute designed to facilitate the national administration of employee health and welfare benefits is now the primary impediment to a broad range of state-based health reforms that would benefit employers and employees alike. The purpose of this paper is to examine the constraints of ERISA preemption in the context of potential health reform initiatives, and the opportunities that might exist to facilitate health care reform initiatives given ERISA preemption. Although ERISA would not impede comprehensive federal health reform legislation, any serious discussion of the states' role in the process needs to take ERISA preemption into account. The thesis of this paper is that the dominant trend in ERISA litigation has been to preempt challenges to state legislation and liability lawsuits against health plans. From the beginning, judicial opinions in ERISA litigation have generally favored preemption over allowing state regulation of Employee Benefit Plans (EBPs) (e.g., private employer sponsored health insurance), and preempted most lawsuits challenging a health plan's denial or delay of health care benefits. Whenever lower courts stray somewhat from preemption, the inevitable reaction at the appellate level is to restore preemption as the default option.
To provide an overview of ERISA, the next section briefly describes the salient provisions that might affect health reform legislation, followed by a summary of ERISA litigation trends. Although the primary focus in this paper is the extent to which ERISA preempts state-based insurance regulation, it is also necessary to consider patients' state medical liability litigation against health insurance plans (including managed care organizations) to understand the policy context and implications. The paper then focuses on current litigation challenging state health reform initiatives, and concludes with a discussion of potential policy solutions.
I. An ERISA Primer
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 primarily to regulate pension plans, but also included health benefit plans within its scope. 3 ERISA governs EBPs, including health care benefits (defined broadly to include any medical, surgical, or hospital benefits) covering approximately 65% of the insured population. 4 ERISA's goals are to: establish uniform national standards; safeguard employee benefits from loss or abuse; and encourage employers to offer those benefits. ERISA does not mandate that employers offer benefit plans, but provides a structure for national uniformity of administration once such plans are extended. Nevertheless, ERISA has several provisions that directly affect state health reform initiatives: the preemption provisions, its limited remedial scheme, and its fiduciary duty obligation.
Many observers and stakeholders credit ERISA preemption with facilitating the growth of managed care and allowing large employers to develop national coverage arrangements for employees. The consequences of ERISA preemption lie at the heart of past congressional debates over whether proposed patients' rights legislation, if enacted, would permit patients to sue health plans for delayed or denied care, and whether the current state-based health reforms underway or under consideration can survive an ERISA preemption challenge. Throughout this discussion, it is important to keep in mind that ERISA presents a series of tradeoffs and careful balancing between protecting the interests of health plan beneficiaries (i.e., employees) and encouraging employers to adopt and fund EBPs.
A. ERISA's Preemption Clause
Traditionally, states are responsible for regulating health care delivery, and litigation against health care providers is resolved under state law. Medical liability lawsuits are rarely heard in federal courts. ERISA alters the traditional approach because it preempts state law, which means that state laws purporting to regulate health plans may not be enforced in any court. 5 context, state laws include legislation and regulations, such as those mandating particular benefit coverage, and most medical liability actions targeting health plans. ERISA preempts state laws that attempt to regulate EBPs (both self-funded and fully insured) and drastically limits state medical liability lawsuits against health plans, while providing minimal federal regulation in their place. But ERISA does not prevent a state from regulating the underlying insurance coverage that an individual purchases in either the commercial market or as provided to an employer group plan. Drawing the line between the two concepts has not been easy and adds to ERISA's general complexity. The end result is that states can mandate insurance benefit coverage for non-ERISA plans, but not for an EBP.
From the beginning, courts have interpreted the preemption clause broadly to prevent enforcement of state laws ranging from laws protecting the physician-patient relationship to litigation challenging how cost containment initiatives are implemented. The courts have held that Congress intended such broad preemption of state law to allow a multistate employer to offer a single, nationally consistent plan to all its workers without the cost and inconvenience of complying with contradictory state regulations, legislation, or litigation. National uniformity conforms to congressional intent to keep the costs of administering an EBP low to encourage employers to offer health coverage. 6 In assessing whether a particular state law is prohibited, courts look sequentially to each of the three parts of the preemption provision. First, courts decide whether the state law "relates to" an EBP. 7 In doing so, courts consider whether the challenged law burdens the administration of plan benefits or has only a remote impact on them. Courts generally hold that ERISA preempts state laws that bind employers or plan administrators to particular benefit choices or that preclude the uniform administration of an EBP. 8 For example, a state lawsuit challenging a benefit determination, such as a health plan's denial of additional hospital coverage, relates to an employer-sponsored health plan because that challenge would require the court to interpret the plan's benefits, hence binding the administrator to certain actions. But laws with only a remote or incidental effect on plan administration, such as a surcharge on hospital services, may not relate to the EBP.
A law is not preempted merely because it relates to a plan. Courts must also interpret two qualifying provisions, ERISA's "savings" and "deemer" clauses. The savings clause provides that laws regulating the business of insurance, even if they relate to an EBP, will not be preempted. Under the savings clause, states are not preempted from enacting and enforcing state laws governing the business of insurance (i.e., state regulation of health insurance), such as solvency or licensing requirements. In turn, the deemer clause qualifies the savings clause. The deemer clause prevents states from deeming (or characterizing) an ERISA-covered plan as the business of insurance. States may not characterize a self-funded plan as an insurer to circumvent the effect of the "relates to" provision.
As an example of how these terms interact, consider a state law mandating certain health insurance benefits. That law relates to an ERISA plan since it would involve the structure of plan benefits. Even though the legislation would be saved from preemption insofar as it regulates EBPs that purchase traditional insurance policies, it would still be preempted if, for instance, a state attempted to apply the statute to a self-funded EBP. Under the deemer clause, a self-funded EBP cannot be an insurer. 
B. ERISA's Limited Remedies
ERISA provides some relief for injuries to health plan participants through its civil enforcement scheme. A plan participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action against an administrator who fails to comply with a request for information about the plan, to recover claimed benefits, to enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits. 9 A plan participant may also bring suit against a plan fiduciary who breaches any fiduciary duties, and may seek to enjoin practices which violate ERISA or the terms of the plan.
Even if victorious, a plan participant can usually only recover the amount of the benefits that should have been provided, as well as certain incidentals such as attorneys' fees. This is a decidedly more limited remedy than usually available under state law, where the patient might be able to recover damages for any economic losses, non-economic damages for pain and suffering, and possibly punitive damages, especially in cases alleging bad faith insurance denial. 10 Effectively, this insulates the health plan from exposure to monetary damages, except for what it would have paid (the amount of the denied benefit) in the first place.
C. Fiduciary Duties
ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on those who make discretionary decisions on behalf of the EBP. A fiduciary must discharge his or her discretionary functions "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" of the plan.
11 In many, but not all cases, 12 courts have held that health plans are subject to this fiduciary duty when making certain decisions, such as reviewing the appropriateness of a physician's treatment recommendations. 13 On the other hand, health plans and employers are not considered fiduciaries with regard to establishing or changing the terms of the plan. Thus, the fiduciary duty extends only to decisions made once the plan is in place.
14 Employers must provide whatever health benefits they promise, but need not offer plans at all and can change what they offer after giving plan beneficiaries proper notice.
Another aspect of the fiduciary duty is to preserve plan assets, meaning that the fiduciary must balance the interests of an individual beneficiary against the interests of all plan participants. In exercising the fiduciary duty, one obvious problem is that the clinical needs of one patient may conflict with the health plan's economic interests (i.e., preserving plan assets to benefit all participants). Increasingly, disappointed plan beneficiaries have sued for breach of fiduciary duty, often challenging the denial of physician-prescribed benefits, especially when there is a potential conflict of interest. 15 To determine whether a health plan breached its fiduciary duty when denying plan benefits (i.e., that the denial is not "solely in the interest of the participant"), courts employ different levels of scrutiny based on the amount of discretion granted to the plan under the EBP. Generally, courts are very deferential, upholding the plan administrator as long as the plan expressly grants discretion to the plan administrator and the decision was not arbitrary and capricious. 16 In most cases, courts have equated compliance with the terms of the EBP as, by definition, acting in the interests of the plan participant. As a result, the court limits its review to ensuring that the plan administrator reasonably comported with the terms of the EBP. interest must be considered as perhaps the most important factor in deciding whether there was an abuse of the fiduciary's discretion.
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D. Federal Regulations
The Department of Labor (DOL) has jurisdiction over ERISA. For the most part, DOL has taken a hands-off approach to EBPs (focusing on pensions), limiting its regulatory oversight to some specific procedural requirements. To be sure, these procedural regulations, such as the types of information that must be provided to plan beneficiaries and participants, how claims are handled, and required reporting to DOL, are hardly trivial. But they are not the kinds of substantive regulations that are equivalent to state insurance oversight and enforcement. In essence, ERISA preemption creates a regulatory vacuum where states cannot act and there is no comparable federal regulatory presence.
II. ERISA Litigation Trends
To understand the nature of the ERISA preemption challenges to current state-based health reform initiatives, it is helpful to sketch the trends in ERISA litigation. Although there are numerous branches of ERISA litigation, the two that are most important for health reform are cases dealing with preemption of state tort lawsuits for delayed or denied health care, and those challenging state regulation of health plans and other health insurers. The reason why we need to look at both types of cases is that they do not operate in isolation from one another. How the courts interpret ERISA in one line of cases influences the judicial analysis of the statute in the other area. 19 In this sense, both aspects are interpreted simultaneously and contribute equally to the development of legal doctrine in ERISA preemption litigation over time. Because this paper is more concerned with health reform, the subsequent analysis will focus on those cases rather than on the state tort litigation decisions.
As noted earlier, the dominant trend in ERISA litigation from the beginning has been to favor preemption over more expansive interpretations that would otherwise provide states with flexibility to oversee how employer-sponsored health plans operate. For many reasons, however, any general statement about ERISA trends is contestable. To begin with, there is little academic agreement on exactly what the cases really signify, 20 and little judicial consensus on how to interpret ERISA and which lines of ERISA cases to follow. Finding coherence from the myriad of ERISA opinions is quite difficult. At best, ERISA doctrine is neither predictable nor stable; it is, rather, largely muddled and most opinions are impenetrable.
A. The Early Litigation: 1983-1995
Initial conditions matter, and early ERISA preemption rulings consistently favored a broad reading of the statute, especially the "relates to" provision. With rare exception in the early litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court broadly preempted state tort litigation and state regulations of health insurance plans. 21 In these cases, the Court defined the "relates to" provision very broadly to preempt virtually any law that either refers or connects to (no matter how remotely) an administrator's benefit determination. For example, the Court preempted a state law requiring pregnancy related health benefits because it related to (i.e., burdened) the administration of an EBP (prior to Congress's enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978). 22 Viewed as a whole, the early rulings established the Court's approach of interpreting congressional intent as encouraging multistate employers to offer employees a single plan that could be administered nationally without the cost and inconvenience of complying with contradictory state regulations.
Deference to congressional intent meant broad preemption. 23 A review of the Congressional record, however, indicates Congress' overarching purpose of ERISA was to protect plan participants and beneficiaries (i.e., employees). 24 And Congress' failure to give much thought to the implications of adding health benefits to what was primarily a pension statute resulted in the Court having considerable latitude on interpreting the scope of preemption. While the broad preemption rulings were not necessarily inconsistent with the legislative history, nothing in either the language of the statute or its legislative intent required these results. 25 Part of the interpretive difficulty was that the statute predated the emergence of managed care as the dominant mechanism for financing and delivering health care. At any time, of course, Congress could intervene to clarify its intent.
Despite the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which explicitly reserves insurance regulation to the states, these early rulings divested states of regulatory authority over EBPs. As a consequence, the Supreme Court uniformly favored broad preemption of state involvement over a narrower sphere allowing states some room to regulate and hold health plans accountable. Because ERISA provides no substantive terms of its own and DOL as the regulatory agency has eschewed substantive regulation of EBPs, the oft-noted regulatory vacuum emerged.
Aside from the doctrinal consequences, the decisions themselves are basically impenetrable. Neither lower court judges nor academics could easily understand and apply the rulings in subsequent cases. Even Supreme Court judges admitted the muddle that their rulings created. For instance, the committed textualist Justice Anonin Scalia subsequently concluded that "Applying the 'relate to' provision according to its terms was a project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else." 27 where the Court signaled that state laws having only an indirect economic connection to EBPs would not be preempted. In this case, New York State imposed hospital bill surcharges on all commercial insurers other than the Blues. The Court ruled that the surcharge was a general health regulation that had only an indirect effect on EBPs, and did not bind plan administrators to any particular benefit choice. After Travelers, courts have been willing to uphold state health insurance regulations against an ERISA preemption challenge where the legislation has only an indirect effect on an EBP. In fact, as discussed below, applying the direct-indirect analysis to current state health reform legislation is one key in determining whether state reform initiatives will survive an ERISA preemption challenge.
Two subsequent Supreme Court rulings on state regulation of health plans also seemed to indicate a judicial willingness to reexamine the conceptual basis of ERISA preemption doctrine. 30 Relying on the Moran case, the Court ruled that AWP laws were saved from ERISA preemption as being specifically directed toward the insurance industry, even if they placed limits on other sectors (in this instance, on physicians). Recognizing that its prior cases failed to provide the lower courts with clear guidance, the Court redefined a two-part savings clause to determine when a state law will be deemed to regulate insurance: "First, the state law must be specifically be directed toward entities engaged in insurance. Second,…the state law must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured." Because the AWP law at issue altered the scope of bargaining between providers and insurers, the Court held that the law met the risk-pooling aspect of the two-part test.
Taken together, the Moran and Miller cases potentially provide greater leeway for states to regulate health insurance arrangements. Along with the direct/indirect analysis in Travelers, these cases provide the analytical framework for determining whether the current state health reform initiatives can survive an ERISA preemption challenge.
State Tort Litigation. Another case in 1995, Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
31 opened an even wider attack on ERISA preemption. The plaintiffs claimed damages in state court under theories of direct and vicarious liability for injuries arising while being treated at a U.S. Healthcare HMO. When Dukes was decided, courts had consistently held that challenges to benefit coverage decisions, including delayed or denied care resulting from cost containment initiatives, were preempted as involving the interpretation of plan benefits. Dukes established the principle that challenges to the technical quality of care (i.e., treatment claims against managed-care organizations for their role in substandard clinical care) do not involve the administration of plan benefits and will not be preempted, allowing state courts to resolve the litigation.
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to clarify its view of the treatment-coverage distinction in Pegram v. Herdrich. 32 In this case, Pegram asserted that her insurance plan's financial incentives for physicians led her doctor to delay an abdominal ultrasound. During the delay, her appendix ruptured, resulting in peritonitis. After the lower court held that ERISA preempted this claim, she reframed the litigation as a breach of fiduciary duty Court's language was ambiguous as to the kinds of mixed treatment and coverage decisions (i.e., those instances raising both coverage and treatment aspects) that should be subject to state law.
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C. Preemption Redux: 2004-2008
The viability of state tort action against health plans did not last long. In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 34 the Court clarified that mixed treatment-coverage cases (arguably the most contentious and numerous issues likely to be challenged), would indeed be preempted, holding that ERISA preempts a Texas law imposing a duty to exercise ordinary care in handling benefit coverage decisions. The Davila case makes a swift retreat from the expectation that Pegram supported the treatment-coverage distinction. Equally important, the Court refused to extend its rulings in the Miller and Moran cases. Without an extended analysis, the majority opinion rejected the claim that the Texas law should be saved from preemption as regulating insurance. The Court simply stated that the Texas law provided a claim for benefits outside of ERISA's remedial scheme, but did not disclose its reasoning for why the Texas law differed from the laws considered in Miller and Moran. 
Lower Court Interpretations of
D. Interpretations of State Health Reform Legislation
The central question on the health policy agenda right now is whether ERISA will preempt state health reform initiatives. For our purposes, I will focus on what I expect will be the two key preemption issues to address-"pay-or-play" systems and individual mandates. 39 The leading example of state-based health reform legislation is the much-discussed Massachusetts plan enacted in 2006.
The Massachusetts approach combines individual and employer mandates with government subsidies. By far the most controversial and landmark aspect of the legislation is the individual mandate, which places responsibility on the individual to obtain health insurance. If an individual can afford insurance and chooses not to purchase it, he or she can be fined. Employers with more than ten employees are required to make a fair and reasonable contribution to workers' health insurance coverage or else be subject to a $295 assessment per employee. The assessment fee is intended as an incentive to offer insurance.
One of the main aspects of the Massachusetts reform is The Connector, which allows groups to purchase insurance and ensures insurance portability from job to job. The Connector acts as a facilitator between individuals and small businesses and private insurance plans to ensure that these plans are of high value and good quality.
To fund the program, the plan redistributes existing funding, including Medicaid payments for safety net providers and the uncompensated care pool. New funding comes from employer contributions and general fund revenues. The Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Plan provides subsidized health insurance for households with income up to 300% of the federal poverty level.
Pay-or-Play. Somewhat surprisingly, there has been no ERISA challenge to the Massachusetts law. Since then, other states and municipalities have enacted variations of the Massachusetts law that have resulted in ERISA preemption litigation. Already, there are three appellate decisions (discussed below) and several law review commentaries analyzing states' pay-or-play health reform initiatives. Two of the three cases ruled that ERISA preempted the legislation, while the third overturned the lower's court's preemption decision. Although the specifics differ across the states, the essential organizing principle of current state health reform initiatives is that employers must either spend a certain amount on employee health care or pay a specified fee (i.e., a tax or assessment) to the state in lieu of providing coverage.
Maryland's Fair Share Act required employers that employed more than 10,000 workers to spend at least 8% of their total payroll on employees' health care or spend at least 8% of total payroll on employees' health care costs. Otherwise, employers were required to pay the difference between their spending and 8% of total payroll to Maryland's Medicaid fund. The law was soon referred to as the Wal-Mart law because it only affected one company. In Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder, 40 the court ruled that ERISA preempted the Act because it interfered with plan administration. By forcing the employer to restructure its plan to offer a state-imposed minimum level of health benefits, the statute impermissibly related to ERISA. Suffolk County, New York, enacted similar legislation which also effectively only applied to Wal-Mart. Under the Suffolk County law, non-unionized retailers were required to spend the health cost rate amount on health benefits of each employee for each hour worked regardless of their full or part-time status. In the alternative, employers could make a lump sum payment to a community health center equal to the number of hours worked by employees multiplied by the public health cost rate. In Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Suffolk County, 41 the court ruled that ERISA preempted the legislation. As in the Maryland case, the court determined that the legislation did not offer any real choice to employers other than to restructure its benefits plans. The interference with the administration of an employer-sponsored ERISA plan impermissibly related to ERISA. general applicability to all insurers may escape direct gulation of or reference to ERISA. te and local health reform efforts will remain in ERISA limbo (otherwise known as urgatory).
contributions to the employee, reimbursement for health services, or payments to the City to be used on behalf of their covered employees. Under the ordinance, if the employer fails to make the required expenditure on behalf of its employees, it must make payments directly to the City. The ordinance is designed to provide access to care for uninsured adults living in San Francisco who do not qualify for coverage under Medicaid. In contrast to the above two cases, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City and County of San Francisco 42 ruled that ERISA does not preempt the ordinance.
The Ninth Circuit found that the ordinance does not regulate benefits or charges for benefits provided by ERISA plans, stating that: "First, the Ordinance does not require employers to establish their own ERISA plans or to make any changes to any existing ERISA plans….Second, the Ordinance is not concerned with the nature of the health care benefits an employer provides its employees." 43 Most importantly, the court also found that the ordinance does not bind ERISA administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining plan eligibility or entitlement to particular benefits. Relying on Travelers, the court instead concluded that the ordinance does not relate to an ERISA plan. 44 With regard to the Fielder case, the Ninth Circuit argued that the two cases are compatible because Maryland left employers without real options, writing, "[i]n stark contrast to the Maryland law in Fielder, the City-payment option offers employers a meaningful alternative that allows them to preserve the existing structur 45 
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What accounts for the different case outcomes? In two major areas, San Francisco's law is distinguishable from Maryland's, which may account for the different judicial opinions. First, the San Francisco law applies to a range of employers, and it is akin to a law of general applicability rather than a law directed specifically at an EBP. Second, the options given to employers under the San Francisco law represent real choices (i.e., tangible benefits to employees compared to Maryland less practical alternatives) in the marketplace rather than a forced choice between restructuring ERISA plans or being out of complia a An important difference between the San Francisco law and the Maryland law is that the San Francisco law, at least ostensibly, applies to employers with or without ERISA plans, and is able to function without the existence of such plans. By contrast, the Maryland law was designed to apply to one employer in the state, Wal-Mart. In its decision preempting the Maryland law, the Fourth Circuit paid special attention to this fact. Thus, Maryland's law amounted to a direct regulation on ERISA plans rather than a revenue statute of general applicability. To avoid ERISA preemption, laws that are of re What are the implications for pay-or-play laws? Despite the Ninth Circuit's statement that its opinion does not indicate a split in the federal courts, it seems likely that many observers will reach a different conclusion. If so, the apparent split may hasten Supreme Court review. When combined with the important public policy implications of pay-or-play laws, there is a good chance that the Supreme Court will accept the inevitable appeal of the San Francisco law. In the meantime, lower courts will continue to struggle with the preemption analysis and will likely reach contradictory results. Until the Supreme Court clarifies whether ERISA preempts pay-orplay laws, sta p e. But if the Court reverts to the mean of preemption, as I expect, e laws will be preempted.
) "is e kind of mandated benefit structure that remains ERISA preempted under Travelers." 47 the Maryland pay-or-play ecision (though not specifically referring to an individual mandate).
nge would be unlikely to cceed. 51 At best, the administrative burden is likely to be minimal.
As with the courts, health law commentators are split on whether pay-or-play laws are likely to survive an ERISA preemption challenge. While the weight of the commentary suggests that these laws will be preempted, that assessment is not unanimous. Most of those concluding that pay-or-play laws will be preempted include such commentators as Edward Zelinsky, Kathlynn Polvino, Jon Shimabukuro and Jennifer Staman, who largely adopt the Fourth Circuit's "relate to" analysis. Amy Monahan largely agrees, but indicates that Massachusetts's "soft" pay-or-play law may offer the courts a way of avoiding preemption without burdening plan administration. In contrast, Pat Butler (along with Catherine Fisk and Michael Oswalt) argues that "ERISA should not preempt a well-designed pay-or-play law that offers a dollar-for-dollar credit for employer health care spending because, under the reasoning of the Travelers case, it does not interfere with ERISA plan administration choices." 46 This quote captures the essence of what is likely to be the crux of the argument: if the Supreme Court follows the Travelers line of cases, pay-or-play laws could surviv th Individual Mandates. Unlike pay-or-play, the issue of whether ERISA might preempt laws that would mandate individuals to purchase health insurance (similar to mandatory automobile insurance coverage) has received considerably less attention. As far I can tell, the issue has not yet been litigated. Zelinsky has published an extensive analysis of the issue, concluding that the Massachusetts law (currently the most comprehensive individual health insurance mandate th Zelinsky argues that the individual mandate is not part of a general insurance regulatory scheme that effectively imposes a floor on what benefits plan administrators will be able to offer in Massachusetts. Thus, individual mandates bind plan administrators. Zelinsky argues that the statute dictates plan choices, and dismisses the argument that the Travelers line of cases saves the regulation from preemption because individual mandates only have an indirect effect on EBPs. 48 Zelinsky notes that Fielder rejected a similar analysis in d
Without belaboring the point, I disagree with Zelinsky's analysis on two grounds. First, the mandate goes to individuals, not to any EBP. Indeed, Butler goes further to argue that an individual mandate does not constitute insurance regulation under the savings clause because it is directed to individuals, not insurers, under the Miller test discussed earlier. 49 If there is a burden, it falls on the individual to meet the expected benefits floor or the employer to keep track of expenditures made to meet the employer's obligation. Nothing in the law requires an administrator to adjust its benefit package. Under the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Golden Gate Restaurant Association, the individual mandate would not constitute an EBP because the city establishes and maintains the mandate. Since the EBP is not required to establish or administer insurance benefits under the mandate, the ordinance does not establish or maintain an ERISA plan. 50 Second, under Travelers, as Monahan observes, the individual mandate has such a tangential relationship to an EBP that an ERISA preemption challe su In this context, it is worth noting (at least for analytical, if not necessarily legal, import) that the first prong of DOL's safe harbor for determining when a health plan does not constitute an ERISA plan is that no contributions are made by an employer or employee organization. amending ERISA to permit state health reform experiments to proceed n a sufficient scale.
I. Potential Solutions
any event, individual mandates appear to be insurance regulations of general applicability-to all persons residing in the state-that should be saved from ERISA preemption as legitimate state regulation of insurance. An individual mandate may or may not be des e Summary. At this point, it is anybody's guess how the Supreme Court might rule on whether ERISA preempts pay-or-play systems or how the lower courts would examine ERISA preemption challenges to individual mandates. Small scale reforms will likely survive because they are unlikely to burden EBPs, but will hardly address the real problems facing the health care system. Unfortunately, the kinds of large scale reforms that are desperately needed are likely to be preempted because, almost by definition, they must bind administrators to be successful. Accordingly, I anticipate that pay-or-play systems will not survive an ERISA preemption challenge, while individual mandates will not be preempted. In short, the courts are unlikely to absolve Congress from o II able signal that it does not view its mandate as lleviating market or legislative deficiencies.
ing to the states and constricting Congress's legislative uthority under the Commerce Clause.
54
. Congressional Action ermit broader state health reform itiatives, with patients' rights as a secondary consideration.
Before considering potential solutions, I should add a few words about ERISA in the context of federalism and separation of powers.
53 ERISA is a window through which health policy over the past 20 years or so can be observed. As a philosophical matter, recent Supreme Court doctrine, particularly in ERISA preemption cases, is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. One of the principal interpretive tenets or norms repeatedly stated by the current Supreme Court is that social policy should be made by the elected representatives, not by the courts. The opinions considered above consistently observe that if ERISA preemption is to change, it is Congress's responsibility, not the Supreme Court's, to do so. In strongly deferring to Congress, the Court has sent an unmistak a An important corollary doctrine about the structure of government is federalism-the question of whether power resides with the states or with the federal government. This debate goes back to the earliest days of the republic, with the federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, arguing for a strong central government, while the Jeffersonians argued for greater state sovereignty. From the New Deal through the early 1980s, Supreme Court rulings generally favored the federal government and expanded the reach of federal legislation. Since then, that approach has been reversed, with the Court generally deferr a A During the mid to late 1990s, one of the most contentious health policy debates was over patients' rights, and whether to amend ERISA to permit state-based tort litigation against MCOs. Since 2001 this issue has faded into the background. If the historical trends described earlier are accurate, attempts to amend ERISA are likely to reemerge as a salient health policy issue. Only this time, the primary focus will be on amending ERISA to p in O Because the statutory definition of plan is somewhat tautological, nothing
In theory, amending ERISA preemption would be the easiest way to provide states with needed flexibility to enact health reform proposals. In practice, there is still likely to be considerable congressional opposition to any weakening of ERISA p a health insurance costs, congressional action may be possible.
One consideration is whether Congress could amend ERISA in a way to permit state reforms without opening EBPs to excessive regulatory scrutiny generally. That is, the attempt to allow states greater freedom to pursue a variety of health reform experiments may have the unintended consequence of allowing more expansive state legislative oversight of EBP C proceed without worryin
B. Regulatory Action
Absent amending ERISA, the Obama administration could devise regulatory strategies to mitigate so e:
The Government notes a potential amelioration. Recognizing that "this Court has construed Section 502(a)(3) not to authorize an award of money damages against a non-fiduciary," the Government suggests that the Act, as currently written and interpreted, may "allow at least some forms of 'make-whole' relief against a breaching fiduciary in light of the general availability of such relief in th effective remedy others similarly circumstanced might fruitfully pursue.
As noted, most of the DOL's regulatory actions have been on the pension side, and it has not acted to fill the vacuum on the health care benefits issues. Unlike antitrust, where the judicial and regulatory branches interact-sometimes uneasily-to form antitrust policy, the courts have acted exclusively to shape ERISA preemption doctrine. But DOL could issue regulations that would simultaneously protect patients and plans. Taking an aggressive approach, DOL could define two of the key ERISA terms that courts or legislation has not defined-"plan" and "benefit"-to alleviate the rigidity of ERISA preemption. Is benefit the payment of money, the goods, services the insurance purchases (i.e., medical care) or membership in an MCO? 56 A major flaw in ERISA preemption is the limited damages available if a case is removed to federal court (i.e., patients can only recover the amount of the benefit). To correct that deficiency, DOL might define benefit to include reasonab D with lost wages and pain and suffering.
Similarly, several observers have noted that ERISA does not define a health plan, 57 and the courts have only said that a plan is not the equivalent of the benefits themselves. 58 For reasons that are not obvious, courts have ruled that MCOs are included in the definition of plan, but not physicians. The result has been to preempt MCOs from state tort liability while leaving physicians exposed to full liability when they may not actually control resource allocation 59 prevents DOL from issuing a regulation that clarifies the meaning of these two terms and establishes that th
In terms of the current state health reform legislation, DOL could issue a regulation that sets the contours of how far states could proceed before implicating ERISA preemption. The mechanism for this would be through an interpretation of the savings clause. For example, DOL could adopt the direct/indirect analysis in the Travelers case and provide potential scenarios where a law would be within the scope of the savings clause. Other governmental agencies, particularly the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission's health antitrust guidelines, have used a similar strategy. Likewise, the key judicial consideration in the state reform legislation enacted so far is the dispute over what constitutes other legitimate compliance options in a pay-or-play system. It would be an appropriate regulatory o Beyond the substantive regulations DOL might consider, the agency could adopt procedural regulations that would facilitate the implementation of health reform initiatives. For instance, DOL could place the burden of justifying regulations of EBPs on the states. DOL could outline what it considers to be the appropriate balance between flexible state health reforms and excessive regulation of EBPs. As long as states operate within the safe harbor, DOL would support the reform. If stat c
As to whether courts would uphold these regulations, as a matter of the separation of powers, it would certainly be preferable for Congress to define these terms. Absent that, it would be an appropriate exercise of regulatory discretion to address terms that neither the Court nor Congress has defined. The health insurance industry would undoubtedly contest any regulations that weakened the current force of ERISA preemption. Since these regulations complement rather than undermine ERISA preemption, courts should defer to DOL's expertise. Whether these or similar regulations would result in dramatically different legal doctrine remains to be seen. For instance, courts might balk at any expanded remedy as violating ERISA's exclusive remedial structure. In any event, it will be difficult for regulators to overcome 25 years of judicial doctrine. Suffice it to say that new regulations might provide state legislators with a more level playing field. In particular, new regulations would impose some needed re p
C
Regardless of what the options were at the outset of judicial consideration of ERISA preemption, the broad initial preemption rulings set the tone and scope of ERISA doctrine that continues to this day. Yet if the analysis in this paper is correct, there is a certain consistency that emerges over time-the return to preemption as the default re It is entirely possible that my analysis imposes more of a narrative arc to ERISA interpretation and litigation than it deserves. 62 Other commentators may well argue that there are too many exceptions to justify a "regression to the mean" trajectory. Admittedly, I have not undertaken an adequate empirical analysis to determine whether the analytical frame I have sketched would fit The time has come for a new approach-one that facilitates reform instead of impeding it. the data. As the split among commentators noted throughout suggests, interpreting ERISA litigation trends is highly subjective. There is little clarity as to how ERISA will be interpreted in future cases, and little agree in Part of this uncertainty resides in a statute that is poorly and ambiguously drafted, and largely applicable to pension plans rather than the way health care is now organized and delivered. Congress has refused to amend ERISA, and the Department of Labor has generally refused to regulate it. O Covered employers are required to make minimum "health care expenditures" ranging from $1.17 to $1.76 per employee per hour depending on the number of full-time employees. An employer has several options for meeting its "health care expenditure" requirement. In addition to contributing in some way to payment for health care services or insurance, the employer has the option of paying its required expenditure to the city. Amounts paid to the city will fund the Health Access Program, which aims to provide medical care to the uninsured population of San Francisco.
What is the law's purpose?
Maryland was attempting to address the rising cost of Medicaid and the high proportion of uninsured people in the state. Legislative history indicates that legislators understood the Act as requiring Wal-Mart (the only company to which the act applied) to increase its healthcare spending. The statute was specifically designed only to apply to Wal-Mart.
Provide access to care for uninsured adults living in the city of San Francisco who do not qualify for coverage under Medicaid.
What employers are covered?
Employers with more than 10,000 employees (NOTE: only four employers in the state met this number -Johns Hopkins University, Northrop Grumman, Giant Food, and Wal-Mart. However, the law only applied to Wal-Mart because Johns Hopkins met the lesser requirement for nonprofits and Northrop Grumman and Giant Food spent enough on health care to be exempt).
Under the Employer Spending Requirement, for-profit employers with more than 20 employees and non-profit employers with more than 50 employees.
Amount of employer contribution?
For-profit employers were required to either 1.) spend at least 8% of their payroll on health benefits or 2.) pay the difference directly into the state's newly created public health care fund to defray Medicaid costs. Covered non-profit employers were required to spend 6% of their payroll on health benefits.
Covered employers must contribute $1.17 to $1.76 per hour per employee toward "health care expenditures."
What options do employers have under the law?
"Health insurance costs" defined as any amount paid by an employer to provide health care or health insurance to employees to the extent costs may be deductible under Health care expenditure" is defined as any amount paid by a covered employer to its employees or a third party on behalf of its employees for the
